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EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL BRAIN: LINKING LANGUAGE, 
THINKING, TEACHING AND LEARNING
Several ields of investigation, including developmental psychology, evolutionary psychology, educational research 
and neuroscience have begun to recognize the essentially social quality of human cognition, as represented by the 
concept of the ‘social brain’. In this article, I discuss this concept, its value for psychological studies of teaching and 
learning, and how it can be related to a sociocultural theory of education and cognitive development. This involves 
a consideration of the relationship between individual and collective thinking, and between spoken language use 
and cognitive development. Some implications for understanding and promoting the educational functions of talk 
in the classroom are discussed.
Neil Mercer
University of Cambridge




The concept of the ‘social brain’ was introduced 
by the evolutionary anthropologist Dunbar (1998). 
Essentially, it represents the view that human 
intelligence is intrinsically social: that evolution 
has given us the capacity to operate effectively in 
complex social networks. Such a social perspective 
on cognition has relevance for the study of the 
nature and functions of classroom education, as I 
will explain. However, I will also argue that some 
of the most interesting and important implications 
for understanding how people think, and learn to 
do so, have not been fully recognized by those who 
have developed the concept. In particular, I suggest 
that more account should be taken of the functional 
connections between collective and individual 
thinking activities, and of the role of language in 
those activities. I will present the indings of empirical 
and theoretical research in support of this argument.
THE INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE IN HUMAN 
THINKING
Cognitive psychology has generally upheld 
the common-sense view that thinking just goes 
on in individual minds. For many years, the study 
of how people solve problems or develop new 
understandings together has typically been seen by 
cognitive psychologists as a topic within the ‘softer’ 
domain of social psychology. Collective thinking 
has even been judged as unworthy of the attention 
of ‘scientiic’ psychologists. I recall at one British 
Psychological Society conference in the 1990s 
hearing an eminent cognitive colleague dismissing 
the study of collective remembering as ‘just research 
on chat’. The relatively new field of evolutionary 
psychology has likewise seemed based upon a 
strongly individualistic notion of human evolution, 
of the kind promoted by Dawkin’s (1976) book The 
Selish Gene. On the other hand, social psychologists 
who have investigated collective thinking have 
sometimes used their understanding of it to question 
the validity of experimental cognitive research, not 
only criticizing the quantitative methods associated 
with it but the study of individual cognition itself 
(e.g. Edwards, 1997). Studies of how people think 
alone and how they think together seemed destined 
to be kept apart.
Recently, however, these barriers have begun to 
break down. Across what have been separate ields 
of investigation, there has been some convergence 
between researchers about how the individual/social 
cognition issue should be deined, and its signiicance 
for understanding learning and development. 
In accord with recent criticisms of highly 
individualistic, ‘selish’ interpretations of Darwinism 
(Midgeley, 2010), within evolutionary psychology 
and neuroscience some researchers have begun to 
describe cognition as both an individual and a social 
phenomenon and to emphasise the intrinsically 
social nature of human intelligence. In educational 
research, the development of sociocultural theory 
has been accompanied by a heightened awareness 
of the potential importance of collaborative learning 
and classroom dialogue for children’s learning 
and the development of their understanding. And 
within developmental psychology, research has 
demonstrated the importance of self-regulation and 
metacognition for problem-solving and learning, and 
has highlighted the role of social interaction with 
adults for developing children’s metacognitive and 
self-regulatory skills. I will discuss these matters in 
more detail below.
NEUROSCIENCE, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 
AND THE SOCIAL BRAIN
Dunbar (op. cit.) comments that the conventional 
wisdom over the past 160  years in cognitive 
psychology and neuroscience has been that the 
human brain has evolved as a means for individuals 
to process factual information about the world. 
Investigations in these ields have thus focused on 
individual sensory and information-processing 
abilities. It is only relatively recently that it has been 
suggested that the nature and size of the human 
brain might also relect the survival advantages of 
being able to handle complex social relationships 
(e.g. Brothers, 1990, cited by Dunbar, op. cit.). This 
has encouraged an interest in how we are able to 
sense and respond to the subtle social signals of the 
other people we are interacting with, whether or 
not we are aware of doing so. Social psychologists 
observed some years ago that when people interact, 
they tend to relect each other’s gestures and postures 
(e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) and strive to infer 
each other’s emotions and intentions (Fiedler & 
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Bless, 2001). Such findings can now be linked to 
neuroscience research which has found that ‘mirror 
neurons’ become active when a primate (key research 
has involved monkeys) observes a community 
member carrying out an action which involves 
those same neurons. Commenting on this, Frith and 
Singer (2008, p. 3875) say: “Through the automatic 
activation of mirror systems when observing the 
movements of others, we tend to become aligned 
with them in terms of goals and actions.” This 
suggests that our evolutionary success, as a species, 
was strongly assisted by the emergence of abilities 
not only to coordinate our actions with others (as 
many other animals can also do, par excellence), but 
to infer their mental states and intentions (based on 
an intuitive ‘theory of mind’: Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). In combination, such indings support claims 
for the inherently and distinctively social nature of 
human intelligence. We are creatures evolutionarily 
designed for life in a complex society. As Grist (2009, 
p. 44) explains:
“We become aware of others because our brains 
can apply ‘theory of mind’ – this is the cognitive 
endeavour of attributing thoughts to others. Part of 
theory of mind consists in thinking about what other 
people are thinking about other people – ‘what does 
Jane think about Tom’s behaviour towards Pablo, given 
that Pablo is upset about his father’s illness?’ This is a 
very complicated kind of cognition and is, as far as we 
know, unique to humans. The social brain hypothesis in 
evolutionary anthropology contends that human brains 
have evolved to be as big as they are so that we can 
think about and manage our relationships with other 
people.”
The social brain hypothesis entails a signiicantly 
different conception of human intelligence from 
that which has usually been adopted in mainstream 
psychology. However, there is a danger that this 
perspective merely employs the concept of the 
social brain to generate a new style of individualistic 
explanation for how people are able to negotiate 
the social world, and why some of our individual 
ancestors managed to ‘survive’ in that world better 
than others. That is, it is still associated with an 
inherently individualistic conception of human 
cognition. Thus evolutionary psychologists tend to 
argue for the value of intermental sensitivities for 
promoting individual success in competition and 
combat (e.g. Harcourt, 1989, cited in Dunbar). Taking 
a similar perspective, the linguistic philosophers 
Mercier and Sperber (2011) have even argued that 
the human capacity for reasoning should primarily 
be understood as a social, argumentative mechanism, 
whereby we each strive to persuade others to comply 
with our preferred courses of action. I think that this 
misses one of the most important functions of our 
social-cognitive capabilities, which is that we are 
able to engage collectively in purposeful, relective 
endeavours. Moreover, we learn and develop our 
understanding of the world through social interaction 
which is commonly mediated by language. On the 
one hand, people are able to think collectively; and 
on the other, engagement in such collective activities 
enables the development of individuals’ thinking. 
The concept of the social brain should encourage 
us to investigate cooperative intellectual activity 
and explore its relationship to the development of 
individual cognition.
To engage in such investigations, we need to 
expand the concept of the social brain. Sensitivity 
to the emotions and intentions of others do not only 
help us to pursue our individual agendas: they also 
enable us to create and pursue joint agendas. In 
ways that are just not possible for other species, we 
can jointly activate the practical cycles of planning, 
acting, relecting and re-planning by which we solve 
problems, share knowledge, construct new joint 
understandings. Through becoming sensitive to the 
limits of each other’s levels of understanding, we 
are also able to take part in interactions whereby 
one person helps another to learn. This ability to 
do more than just interact, but rather to ‘interthink’ 
(Mercer, 2000; Littleton & Mercer, 2013) is a key 
characteristic of the social brain. Humans can link 
their individual brains to create a mega-brain, a 
collective problem-solving tool, and it is this, rather 
than individualized competition, which has ensured 
the dominance of our species. The term ‘social brain’ 
should thus carry a double meaning: on the one 
hand, to refer to the special social capabilities of the 
organ we each possess; and on the other to refer to 
the uniquely human capacity to think collectively.
In conversations, we do not only make inferences 
about the mental states of other speakers, we also 
make crucial judgements about their knowledge, 
such as how explicitly we need to reference relevant 
information about matters under discussion. Such 
judgements are particularly important in educational 
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settings when one knowledgeable person is trying to 
help another who is less knowledgeable to advance 
their understanding. Language is the prime means 
at our disposal for making a dynamic assessment 
of shared understanding, and so has a central, 
integrated position in enabling human cognition to 
be both individual and social. As Vygotsky (1962) 
originally argued, language is both a cultural tool 
and a psychological tool, linking the ‘intermental’ 
and the ‘intramental’. He also argued that it is 
inextricably bound up with the development of 
more advanced forms of reasoning. As Vass and 
Littleton put it, “interpsychological thinking is a 
prerequisite for intrapsychological thinking: it is 
through speech and action with others that we learn 
to reason and gain individual consciousness” (2010, 
p. 107). This view is of course at odds with some 
other inluential views on language and cognition, 
notably of those who remain committed to a view of 
language as a discrete cognitive ‘module’ or capacity, 
designed for a transmissional kind of communication 
(e.g. Pinker, 1994, 2007). But emerging findings 
from contemporary neuroscience research support 
the more integrated view, as they suggest that 
mental abilities associated with some non-linguistic 
skills, such as the appreciation of rhythmic patterns 
and structures in music, are also involved in 
language abilities. Thus Goswami (2009, p. 182), 
a neuroscientist who has studied both literacy and 
music, comments:
“If the hypothesis that the dyslexic brain is ineficient 
in phase locking to rhythmic information in speech is 
supported by further studies, we can begin to think 
about how to facilitate children’s ability to phase lock 
to any kind of rhythmic information. For example, 
rhythm is usually more overt in music than in speech. 
So perhaps the neuroscience-enriched educator would 
begin with tapping or dancing in time with music.”
THE EDUCATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF LANGUAGE
A model of the social brain in which language 
is a fully integrated component is compatible with 
a sociocultural theory of education and cognitive 
development derived from Vygotsky’s work (as 
described for example by Daniels, 2001, 2008; it is 
also known as ‘cultural-historical activity theory’: 
van Oers, Wardekker, Elbers & van der Veer, 2008). 
While this theory has some variants, at its basis are 
the premisses that human intelligence is essentially 
social and cultural; and that the relationship between 
social and psychological activity underpins cognitive 
development. As Vygotsky (1978, p. 88) himself put 
it:
“Human learning presupposes a specific social 
nature and a process by which children grow into the 
intellectual life of those around them.”
It has inspired empirical examinations of how 
social interaction influences individual learning, 
problem solving and representations of knowledge. 
It may well be that, as one socio-cultural researcher 
suggests “all too often the focus of sociocultural 
research has been on intermental (social, interactional) 
processes per see, to the neglect of explanations 
of how these intermental processes forge the 
intramental processes that sit at the heart of cognitive 
development” (Rojas-Drummond, 2009, p. 241). 
Nevertheless, the potential of sociocultural theory 
for making the link between social processes and 
individual learning outcomes is there to be exploited. 
It not only links the social and the psychological in an 
account of cognitive development, but also provides 
a theoretical basis for the primacy of language as a 
cultural and cognitive – and hence educational – tool 
(Mercer & Howe, 2012).
Theoretically, the case for the prime role of 
language in cognitive development and learning 
has several strands. The first strand concerns the 
collective process of constructing educational 
knowledge (whether amongst students or between 
teacher and students). This process must, by its 
nature, involve induction into reasoned argument. 
Although much education focuses on the 
transmission and acquisition of knowledge and skills, 
it would be surprising to ind many teachers who did 
not think that their students should be learning how 
to construct arguments to support any claims that 
the opinions, analyses, solutions, or conclusions 
that they present are correct (and that alternative 
claims are not). While arguments can sometimes 
be presented through other communicative modes 
(such as the use of mathematical notation, and 
by physical demonstration in science or music), 
language is essentially involved in all subjects. 
Moreover, achieving competence in speciic subjects 
involves learning to use the specialized discourses 
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of subject communities; and those discourses are 
not mere jargon, but tools designed for pursuing 
scholarship and enquiry. They are functional 
language varieties, or genres (Kress, 1987; Swales, 
1990). Such genres represent ways that individual 
thinking is made accountable to the normative rules 
of speciic communities of thinkers; and luency in 
the appropriate genres is a requisite for full admission 
to those communities. As Lemke (1990) has put it, a 
student of science needs to become a luent speaker 
of science. The same applies to any other subject, and 
to a great many non-academic activities also (such as 
those of the computer and inancial industries: see 
Goodman, 1996). If children’s access to these genres 
is not ensured, their access to wider educational 
opportunities will necessarily be limited (Rochex & 
Crinon, 2011). The situated learning which enables 
people to join communities of practice almost 
always has a linguistic dimension, even if this is not 
highlighted by studies of such processes (Lave & 
Wenger, 1992).
The second strand is an elaboration of Vygotsky’s 
proposed link between the intramental and the 
intramental. If learning a subject like science 
involves learning to ‘speak’ it, then learning to 
think like a scientist must involve learning to think 
in a way that corresponds to the ways that other 
scientists think. Thus the genres of various discourse 
communities provide resources for organizing the 
process of thinking alone. The strength of Vygotsky’s 
model is that he envisaged this psychological-
social relationship as reciprocal: shared social 
representations shape individual cognition, and 
individual insights and arguments can, through the 
use of language and other modes of communication, 
populate the social world. Newton’s ideas about 
gravity did not constitute a scientiic theory until he 
succeeded in communicating his thoughts to other 
people. Shakespeare’s plays were not art until they 
had been shared and performed. Both then became 
resources for the induction of future generations into 
science and the arts. Even in the visual arts, styles of 
painting are distinguished not just through the use 
of specialized vocabulary, but through the linguistic 
invocation of the body of common knowledge that 
underpins critical analysis and the instruction of 
novices. It is through using specialized language 
genres that subjects, disciplines, trades, and other 
ields of human endeavour persist and grow, within 
and across generations.
The third strand is based on an analysis of the 
teacher-student relationship. The process whereby 
an expert guides a novice is one of the basic, key 
features of human society; it is a manifestation of 
the social brain. It depends on the establishment 
and maintenance of a relationship which is normally 
mediated through language. Talk and writing are 
the main tools of a teacher’s trade, even in settings 
where the acquisition of some specific skill is 
assisted by demonstration as well as instruction. 
Instructing a learner, or providing useful feedback 
on their efforts, is very dificult without some kind 
of spoken or written dialogue. As mentioned above, 
a student’s induction by a teacher into the specialized 
language genres of subject is a very important aspect 
of education.
The fourth strand of the argument concerns 
the importance of talk for more symmetrical, 
collaborative types of learning and problem solving. 
I will deal with this strand later, under the heading 
of ‘collaborative learning’.
D I A L O G U E ,  M E T A C O G N I T I O N , 
SELF-REGULATION
The idea might be Vygotsky’s, but we have 
Wertsch (1979) to thank for irst illustrating with 
examples the ways that adult-child communication 
can promote children’s learning and psychological 
development. He offered an original model of the 
intellectual interaction between an adult ‘teacher’ and 
a child working together on a task, based on the level 
of intersubjectivity attained by the participants. This 
helped to clarify Vygotsky’s position on egocentric 
speech, as distinct from Piaget’s – that it should be 
understood in temporal context, as both as product of 
a child’s experience of social speech and a precursor 
of the ‘silent speech’ or ‘inner speech’ of individual 
cognition (Perret-Clermont, 1980). Egocentric 
speech therefore represents a developmental stage 
in the movement from ‘other-regulation’ to ‘self-
regulation’. As I have argued elsewhere (Mercer, 
2008), this set a new agenda for the study of how the 
dialogue of social interaction shapes the development 
of self-regulation, which is such an important aspect 
of individual thinking and learning.
Olson (1988) was one of the irst to suggest links 
between between parent-child talk about mental 
states and the development of ‘theory of mind’. As 
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mentioned above, ‘theory of mind’ is a capacity which 
has been proposed by evolutionary psychologists and 
neuroscientists as central to the functioning of the 
social brain. It is also associated with the broader 
ability to think about thinking – metacognition. 
Research on the development of children’s 
metacognitive skills has shown that this is linked to 
their ability to self-regulate while problem-solving, 
and contributes signiicantly to their effectiveness 
as a learner (Veenman & Spaans, 2005; Whitebread 
& Pino Pasternak, 2010). This research has not 
typically been concerned with the role of spoken 
language use in cognitive development, but some 
links have been made. One involves a consideration 
of how social language use can provide a template 
for the production of ‘inner speech’, which acts as a 
self-regulating mechanism:
“When the child, confronted by a tricky challenge, 
is ‘talked through’ the problem by a more experienced 
agent, the child can often succeed at tasks which would 
otherwise prove impossible (think of learning to tie 
your shoelaces). Later on, when the adult is absent, the 
child can conduct a similar dialogue, but this time with 
herself.” (Clark, 1998, p. 66)
Reviews of research by Whitebread and Pino 
Pasternak (2010) and Dignath, Buettner and Langfeldt 
(2008) have shown that many interventional studies 
based on the principles of making metacognitive 
and learning strategies explicit and encouraging 
participants to relect and talk about their learning 
have obtained signiicant effects. Examples include 
Forman and Cazden’s (1985) co-operative group work 
study; Siegler’s (2002) intervention that required 
children to describe scientiic phenomena and then 
explain their understanding; and Black and Wiliam’s 
(1998) research in which children were encouraged 
to reflect upon and assess their own learning. 
The important role of classroom talk for enabling 
the development of children’s metacognition and 
relection is now becoming more widely recognized 
(Whitebread, Mercer, Howe & Tolmie, 2013).
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THE EFFECTS OF 
DIALOGUE ON LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT
In studies of classroom interaction, the term 
‘dialogue’ has in recent years tended to become more 
common than the earlier term ‘discourse’. They are 
not, though, synonymous. ‘Discourse’ can be used 
to mean any kind of verbal interaction, even of an 
abstract kind – and indeed that has become one of 
the problems of using it to convey a more speciic 
meaning. ‘Dialogue’, on the other hand, has usually 
been employed to describe a particular quality of 
interaction. As Skidmore (2006, p. 203) comments, 
various classroom researchers have independently 
argued that teacher-student talk should become more 
‘dialogic’, introducing such notions such as:
“dialogic instruction, characterized, by the teacher’s 
uptake of student ideas, authentic questions and the 
opportunity for students to modify the topic (Nystrand, 
1997); dialogic inquiry, which stresses the potential of 
collaborative group work and peer assistance to promote 
mutually responsive learning in the zone of proximal 
development (Wells, 1999); dialogical pedagogy, in 
which students are invited to retell stories in their own 
words, using paraphrase, speculation and counter-
fictional utterances (Skidmore, 2000); and dialogic 
teaching, which is collective, reciprocal, supportive, 
cumulative and purposeful” (Alexander, 2004).
To those one might add Wegerif’s (2010) 
advocacy of dialogic education (in which dialogue 
seen as both the medium of education and its goal) 
and Scott’s (2008) of interactive/dialogic talk (which 
allows for the exposition of students’ naïve ideas 
as well as those of more authoritative accounts in 
classroom discussions of scientific phenomena). 
Some initially distinct, separate lines of pedagogic 
research have begun to converge around such ideas 
(as represented by the various authors’ contributions 
to Mercer & Hodgkinson, 2008). Speciic teaching 
techniques have been developed which promote 
the use of language for collective reasoning, 
such as Dawes’ (2012) ‘Talking Points’ whereby 
children are asked to discuss a series of statements 
related to a topic of study and provide reasons on 
whether they are true or false; ‘Concept Cartoons’ 
(Keogh & Naylor, 1999), whereby children are 
offered alternative accounts of natural phenomena 
by cartoon characters and have to decide which is 
correct; and Stein, Engle, Smith & Hughes’ (2008) 
“five practices for helping teachers move beyond 
show and tell” in mathematics classrooms. But to 
what extent is such advocacy of dialogue justiied? 
We need to know if research evidence shows that 
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the quality of spoken dialogue affects the quality of 
educational outcomes. A useful, if crude, distinction 
can be made between two types of talk in educational 
settings: between teachers and students, and between 
students working collaboratively without the teacher. 
I will deal with each in turn.
Teacher-student interaction
Some researchers have made direct links between 
the patterns of parent-child interactions described 
by Wertsch (op.  cit.) and interactions between 
teachers and students in terms of their effects on 
the development of children’s skills in remembering 
(Reese, Haden & Fivushm, 1993). Ornstein, 
Grammer and Coffman, (2010) offer results of a study 
of primary/elementary school teachers who used 
a ‘high mnemonic style’ of dialogue with students, 
with those with a ‘low’ style. Those with a ‘high’ style 
used what the authors call more ‘memory-relevant 
language’, meaning that they proposed methods or 
procedures for remembering to children and asked 
them to explain their own strategies. They assessed 
the impact of variations in style by comparing 
children’s scores on two memorizing tasks over the 
course of a school year. Children taught by ‘high 
mnemonic’ teachers became signiicantly better at 
these tasks. However, drawing also on other research, 
Ornstein et al. comment that the natural incidence 
of such explicitly mnemonic language by teachers is 
very low.
Low natural incidence is not an issue when 
it comes to a different feature of teachers’ talk 
– questions, which have been observed to occur 
frequently in classroom talk the world over. 
There has been much debate amongst educational 
researchers over the years about the functions 
and value of teachers’ questions to students (see 
for example Norman, 1992; Wells, 1999). In 
this debate, it was at one time very common to 
find researchers criticising teachers for using 
questions so much. It was claimed, for example 
by Dillon (1988) and Wood (1992), that because 
most teachers’ questions are invariably designed 
to elicit just one brief ‘right answer’ (which often 
amounts to a reiteration of information provided 
earlier by the teacher) this unduly limits and 
suppresses students’ contributions to the dialogic 
process of teaching-and-learning. Observational 
evidence shows that it is indeed common practice 
(at least in those countries where observational 
research has been carried out) for teachers to use 
such ‘closed’ questions very frequently. Thus in a 
study in English primary schools, Smith, Hardman, 
Wall & Mroz, (2004, p.  410) reported that “In 
the whole class sections of literacy and numeracy 
lessons… most of the questions asked were of a low 
cognitive level designed to funnel pupils’ responses 
towards a required answer.” There is also evidence 
that reducing the number of questions increases 
the length of children’s contributions to dialogue 
(Wood, op. cit.). Not surprisingly, then, Wood and 
others have argued that teachers’ frequent use of 
questions should be discouraged.
However, most classroom researchers now avoid 
simplistic judgements about the problematic nature of 
teachers’ questions. As Wells (1999) and others have 
clearly shown, teachers’ questions can have a range 
of different communicative functions. For example, 
they can be used to test children’s factual knowledge 
or understanding (“What is the nearest planet to 
the sun?”), to manage classroom behaviour (“Could 
we have all eyes to the board please?”) and – less 
obviously – as a way of inding out more about what 
pupils are thinking (“Why did you decide to have 
just three characters in your play?”). In a systematic 
review of research on talk in mathematics classrooms, 
Kyriacou and Issitt (2008) found an association 
with good learning outcomes when teachers make 
regular use of interactional strategies other than the 
usual closed-question exchanges. Reviewing a range 
of studies related to the development of reading 
comprehension, Wolf, Crosson and Resnick, (2006) 
concluded that questions about literary texts that 
encourage students to put the main idea in their 
own words, and press them for elaboration of their 
ideas (for example by asking “How did you know 
that?,” “Why?”) help to promote students’ high-level 
comprehension skills. On the other hand, Wolf et al. 
also conclude that it is not helpful if teachers merely 
check students’ comprehension by seeking yes-no 
answers, leave little room for students to make sense 
of the text and select appropriate evidence to back 
up their thoughts, or frame the question in such 
a way that the students only have to complete the 
teachers’ incomplete sentence. As Dawes (2008) and 
others have suggested, teachers can – and should – 
use questions to serve many pedagogic functions, 
including the following:
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(a)  encourage children to make explicit their 
thoughts, reasons and knowledge and 
share them with the class;
(b)  ‘model’ useful ways of using language that 
children can appropriate for use them-
selves, in peer group discussions and 
other settings (such as asking for relevant 
information possessed only by others, or 
asking ‘why’ questions to elicit reasons);
(c)  provide opportunities for children to 
make longer contributions in which they 
express their current state of understan-
ding, articulate ideas and reveal problems 
they are encountering;
(d)  ask not just one, but several students for 
their initial ideas before going into a topic 
(but not evaluating their responses);
(e)  ask students to comment on each other’s 
views.
These functions of can be related to practical 
theories of didactics in the European tradition. Thus 
in describing a study of what makes teaching effective 
in primary school education, Sensevy (2014, p. 602), 
suggests that teachers need to help their students 
understand that “when the students articulate 
reasons in order to justify their epistemic beliefs, 
they have to do so through the knowledge language-
games that they must master.” Using dialogue, 
teachers are able to help develop their students’ 
understanding in ways that would not be possible if 
classroom talk was limited to the more usual, closed 
question ‘recitation script’. They can enable students 
to relect more carefully on what they themselves do 
or do not know. They can allow students to practice 
speaking the expert genres of a subject. They can 
model ways of regulating learning and problem 
solving that students can internalise. And the beneits 
are reciprocal. From hearing their students explain 
their understanding (or misunderstanding), teachers 
can gain a better understanding of what students 
do know, or do not know, and so adjust their 
‘scaffolding’ and instructional teaching accordingly 
(Soong & Mercer, 2011).
Questions are of course just one common feature 
of teacher talk. Our study of teachers in Mexican 
classrooms (Rojas-Drummond & Mercer, 2004) 
found that those who achieved the best learning 
outcomes organized more interchanges of ideas 
and mutual support amongst pupils and generally 
encouraged pupils to take a more active, vocal role 
in classroom events than the less effective teachers. 
In general terms, a teacher’s commitment to the 
use of such strategies relected their conception of 
learning as a social, communicative process. That is, 
they enacted a sociocultural model of education even 
though they did not necessarily know it as such.
Scott (op.  cit.) and Alexander (2008) have 
independently argued that teachers should strive 
for a better balance in whole-class sessions between 
‘authoritative’, teacher-led talk (which predominates 
in classrooms the world over) and more genuine 
dialogue in which students have opportunities to 
express their understandings and misunderstanding, 
think aloud, ask questions and explore ideas without 
being immediately evaluated as ‘wrong’ or ‘right’ by 
the teacher. The evidence for the effects of different 
styles of teacher-talk on students’ motivation, 
learning and conceptual development is not very 
precise and lacks much quantitative content, but it 
has encouraged quite a strong consensus amongst 
researchers about what is functionally valuable.
Collaborative learning
Research on collaborative learning and problem 
solving has been an active ield since the middle of the 
last century. Research has been both observational 
and interventional. Interventional methods have 
commonly been to try to improve social relations 
or communications amongst students and see if 
this improves the quality of collaborative learning, 
and hence learning outcomes. When such research 
achieves positive results, as it often has, it offers 
support for the ‘social brain’ hypothesis, and for 
the special importance of language. As Jones (2008, 
p. 81) puts it, ‘the coordination of collective activity 
through language presupposes individuals who are 
capable of using language as a means of organising 
and controlling their own actions and behaviour 
within the communal task.’
Some carefully designed research studies have 
provided intriguing results. For example, Howe 
(2010) describes a series of related studies on 
collaborative work by 8-15 year olds. Most of these 
studies concerned children’s understanding of 
science, and involved children being given specially 
designed practical tasks in which they typically had 
to predict the outcomes of the relevant events. For 
example, 8 year olds were asked to predict whether an 
empty metal box, or a solid rubber ring, would loat 
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in a tank of water. Having agreed on a prediction, 
they would then test this out using real objects. The 
children were pre- and post-tested (using either their 
oral responses or written answers to tests) about 
their understanding of the relevant phenomena. In 
this way, Howe and her colleagues established that 
signiicantly better results on post-tests of learning 
and understanding were obtained when (a) groups 
of children were asked to seek agreement on their 
predictions before testing them (even if they did 
not achieve agreement); (b) children worked in a 
group in which contrasting opinions were expressed. 
Moreover, it did not seem to matter whether 
agreement was actually reached, or if contrasting 
views were reconciled. What was important was that 
these were features of the discussions.
In explaining these results, Howe suggests that 
(a) having to seek agreement encourages children 
to pursue their discussions in more depth and 
to more certain conclusions and (b)  unresolved 
contradiction during conversation particularly primes 
children’s metacognition – with the result that they 
subsequently relect more on what they think about 
the phenomenon, and on the significance of their 
observations. She comments that this research “does 
not merely confirm that sociocognitive conflict, 
transactive dialogue, exploratory talk, or whatever 
can precipitate growth; it also shows that these forms 
of social interaction are so powerful that they can 
sustain cognitive activity over many weeks when, as 
often seems to happen with children, differences are 
not immediately resolved.” (Howe, op .cit., p. 80). 
The studies of collaborative learning in the classroom 
described by Howe and others such as Slavin (2009) 
and Roseth, Johnson and Johnson (2008) have 
provided convincing evidence for the educational 
value of providing structured opportunities for 
collective thinking. Group-based activities have been 
found to assist the study of mathematics (Sfard, 2001; 
Mercer and Sams, 2006; Slavin, Groff and Lake, 2009) 
and science (Howe, op. cit., Mercer, Dawes, Wegerif, 
and Sams, 2004). Most research has involved children, 
but some studies have been carried out with adults. 
These have found, for example, that experience of 
group-based reasoning activities improves subsequent 
individual performance of reasoning on a task 
(e.g. Augustinova, 2008; Maciejovsky & Budescu, 
2007, cited in Mercier & Sperber, op. cit).
Observational research has suggested that for 
dialogue in groups to be productive (in terms 
of assisting problem-solving, learning and the 
development of understanding), it should have the 
characteristics of what has been called Exploratory 
Talk (a term originally used by Barnes, 1976). 
Exploratory Talk “represents a joint, coordinated 
form of co-reasoning, with speakers sharing 
knowledge, challenging ideas, evaluating evidence 
and considering options in a reasoned, equitable 
way.” (Mercer & Littleton, 2007, p. 62). Others have 
used the terms ‘transactive dialogue’ (Berkowitz, 
Gibbs & Broughton, 1980) and ‘accountable talk’ 
(Resnick, 1999; Keefer, Zeitz & Resnick, 2000) to 
describe similar ways of using talk as an effective 
tool for collective reasoning. A recent review of 
research on collective problem solving activity 
across a range of settings – including workplaces 
as well as classrooms – suggests that Exploratory 
Talk is essentially the kind of communication which 
engenders successful ‘interthinking’ (Littleton & 
Mercer, 2013). As a speech genre, it represents one 
of the most important tools in our cultural toolkit. 
However, research also shows that Exploratory Talk 
is quite rare in classrooms, in comparison with less 
analytic and less collaborative types of interaction. 
This helps explain the apparent paradox of some 
research on group work indicating that on the one 
hand it is commonly badly organised and of little 
educational value (Bennett & Cass, 1989; Galton, 
Hargreaves, Comber, Wall, & Pell, 1999; Blatchford 
& Kutnick, 2003; Wegerif & Scrimshaw, 1997) and 
on the other (as in the research described above) a 
distinctive and valuable mode of learning. To make 
the most of opportunities for applying the affordances 
of the social brain during group work, it is necessary 
to maximise the use of Exploratory Talk. This 
encourages us to relate the quality of the dialogue 
which takes place in groups and the quality of talk 
that goes on in teacher-led whole-class sessions.
USING TEACHER-STUDENT TALK TO IMPROVE 
COLLABORATIVE LEARNING IN GROUPS
“By listening carefully to what others say, by giving 
emphasis to reasoned understanding rather than to 
formulaic answers, and by trying to help the class to 
arrive at consensus in a shared understanding rather 
than by imposing a conclusion arbitrarily, a teacher can 
make whole-class dialogue a model for pupils’ group 
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discussions. In both contexts, pupils are experiencing 
engagement in reasoned discourse” (Black, 2009, p. 4.).
Black’s comments, based on his own work in 
science education, have wider empirical support. 
For example, Webb, Nemer and Ing (2009) report 
that differences between teachers in which they 
asked students to elaborate their problem-solving 
strategies corresponded strongly to the extent to 
which students did so during group discussions. 
Their general conclusion is that one of the main 
inluences on children’s talk in groups is the kind of 
talk that their teacher uses in interactions with them; 
but that teachers do not commonly model effective 
discussion in whole class sessions. Many, perhaps 
most, children do not have many opportunities to 
learn how to conduct reasoned discussions in their 
out-of-school lives, or do not realize that they should 
conduct them on these occasions. If school does 
not provide that guidance, they are less likely to do 
so. It is not so surprising, then, that in peer group 
discussions the talk is often unproductive.
Some interventional research has trained teachers 
to lead small groups of students in a ‘dialogic’ 
manner. Anderson and colleagues have carried out 
several studies of the effects of teachers using the 
approach they call ‘collaborative reasoning’ to lead 
students in discussions of literary texts. Retznitkaya 
and Anderson’s (2001) study involved 115 ifth grade 
(i.e. 10-11 years old) students from 3 classrooms, 
who participated in collaborative reasoning 
discussions for a period of 5 weeks. These students 
and students from three comparable classrooms who 
had not engaged in collaborative reasoning, were 
asked to write persuasive essays. The essays of the 
intervention class students were found to contain a 
signiicantly greater number of relevant arguments, 
counter-arguments, rebuttals, formal argument 
devices, and uses of text information. Through 
analyzing the talk during such interventions, in 
which a teacher modelled and guided discussions of 
that kind about literary texts, Chinn, Anderson and 
Wagner observed:
“Four cognitive processes integral to good thinking 
and greater learning were found more frequently in 
Collaborative Reasoning discussions than in Recitations 
[i.e those based on the traditional ‘closed question’ 
type of interaction]. In comparison with students 
in Recitations, students in Collaborative Reasoning 
discussions (a) made many more elaborations, (b) made 
many more predictions, (c) provided evidence at a rate 
nearly 10 times higher than in Recitations, and (d) were 
much more likely to articulate alternative perspectives.” 
(Chinn, Anderson & Waggoner, 2001, p. 398)
Other researchers have tried to ensure that group 
work (not involving the teacher) is more effective 
by encouraging teachers to use whole class sessions 
to guide and model the effective use of language 
for reasoning. The Thinking Together intervention 
studies carried out by myself and colleagues have 
so far involved more than 700 children, aged 6-14. 
They represent a continuing attempt to link small 
group activity and whole-class interactions through 
the implementation of the kind of pedagogy which 
Alexander (2008) calls ‘dialogic teaching’, embodying 
a sociocultural theory and pedagogy based on 
language as the prime cultural and psychological tool. 
These studies have been described in detail elsewhere 
(for example, Mercer & Littleton, 2007), so I will 
summarise here only those aspects relevant to my 
argument. The typical form of each of the studies has 
been as follows. Teachers of intervention classes are 
introduced to the concept of Exploratory Talk, and 
offered ways of developing their students’ awareness 
of this genre of language use as a basis for working 
together effectively. Essentially, each class agrees to 
follow a set of ‘ground rules’ for talking together in 
groups, which early studies showed help to generate 
Exploratory Talk. Students are encouraged to apply 
these rules during all curriculum-related group 
work, and the teacher uses whole-class sessions to 
model Exploratory Talk and encourage children’s 
meta-awareness of the ways they use language for 
reasoning. Compared with control classes following 
their normal course of study, results have shown that 
children who follow the intervention programme 
begin to use much more Exploratory Talk, pursue 
group activities more cooperatively and become 
better at solving problems together than those in 
control classes. Moreover – and crucially for the 
case I am making here – they also become better at 
reasoning and solving problems alone. So in one study 
(Mercer, Dawes, Wegerif & Sams, 2004) involving 
an intervention of 10 weeks, we found that one set 
of Year 5 children (aged 10-11) improved both their 
collective and their individual performances on 
the Raven’s Progressive Matrices test of non-verbal 
reasoning signiicantly more than did children in 
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control classes (Raven, Court & Raven, 1995). They 
also gained significantly better scores in national 
tests of science and maths; but let us stay with their 
improved reasoning. Their enhanced performance 
was achieved through a programme which 
speciically targeted the spoken language use of the 
teachers and children: they were not given additional 
practice in doing non-verbal reasoning. Instead, the 
teachers used dialogic methods to raise children’s 
metacognitive awareness of how they talked together, 
and establish common ‘ground rules’ for how they 
would talk and work together in groups. The prime 
goal was for the children to master the genre of 
Exploratory Talk as a cultural tool. They then applied 
this to their curriculum-related work. That this 
would improve the quality of their group work is not 
surprising, given the indings of research on effective 
collaborative learning (as reviewed above). It is also 
in accord with the results of some studies involving 
adult participants, which found that the generation 
of debate was a requirement for group activities to 
lead to improved performance on reasoning tasks: 
see for example Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, 
Kerschreiter and Frey (2006). But the effect of this on 
their individual reasoning scores is more surprising. 
However, it is relevant to note that both sets of 
groups (control and experimental) were given two 
opportunities to do the Raven’s test in groups, as well 
as (using a different version of the test) on their own, 
before the intervention and after it. The intervention 
children obtained better group and individual scores 
on the post-intervention collaborative application of 
the test than the control children. The intervention 
class children would therefore have been able to 
apply their improved skills in Exploratory Talk to 
this post-intervention group task, while the control 
children would not (we observed little change in 
their discussion skills over the intervention period).
There are thus three possible explanations for the 
greater individual improvements in reasoning of the 
intervention class children, which might be called 
appropriation, co-construction and transformation:1
(a)  Appropriation: Children can learn success-
ful problem-solving strategies and expla-
natory accounts from each other during 
group work. Because of their greater use 
of Exploratory Talk, the experimental 
children would be more likely to share 
relevant knowledge effectively as they car-
ried out the Raven’s test together, as they 
would explain and justify their strategies 
to each other. They would thus be more 
likely to acquire new, successful reasoning 
strategies from each other and go on to 
apply them;
(b)  Co-construction: By using Exploratory 
Talk to coordinate their mental efforts, 
the intervention children would use de-
bate to jointly construct new, robust, ge-
neralizable strategies and/or explanations 
together for completing the Raven’s test. 
This is sometimes called the ‘assembly 
bonus effect’, whereby the performance 
of the group is better than that of its best 
member (Laughlin, Hatch, Silver & Boh, 
2006). The children could then each, in-
dividually, go on to on to use these effec-
tive strategies and solutions when faced 
with new, similar problems;
(c)  Transformation: The intervention child-
ren’s dialogic training and practice in the 
use of Exploratory Talk would develop 
their abilities to reason collectively. By 
requiring their reasoning to be made ex-
plicit, it would also promote their metaco-
gnitive awareness of how they reasoned. 
They would thus become more able than 
the control class children to examine pos-
sible problem-solving strategies in a criti-
cal way and regulate their own problem 
solving when doing a task like the Raven’s 
test. That is, Exploratory Talk provided 
a dialogic model for the development of 
individual reasoning.
All three explanations are compatible with 
sociocultural theory. All three acknowledge, in 
different ways, the case for the special signiicance 
of language use in the development of reasoning, 
and of the social brain. All three could probably 
be used to explain the positive results of other 
studies of collaborative learning. They are not 
mutually exclusive. But while the ‘appropriation’ 
and ‘co-construction’ explanations are relatively 
prosaic, the ‘transformation’ explanation is not. It is a 
reformulation of Vygotsky’s (1978) claims about the 
transformative effects not only of social experience 
on psychological development, but of the key role of 
language in shaping individual cognition. It suggests 
that even non-verbal reasoning has a language base. 
This is compatible with claims made by Wegerif 
(2010) and Mercier and Sperber (2011) that human 
reasoning is essentially dialogic, and so functions 
best when set in argumentative contexts.




In summary, I have argued that the concept of 
the ‘social brain’ can help us recognize cognition 
as both an individual and a social phenomenon, in 
its practice and in its development. It can also help 
to bring together some separate areas of research, 
particularly those on neuroscience, metacognition, 
linguistics, self-regulation, collaborative learning 
and pedagogy. To be useful in this way, however, 
it must carry more than the limited meaning it has 
commonly been given in evolutionary psychology, 
anthropology and neuroscience, that we are each 
naturally equipped to be sensitive to the emotional 
states of other people and are able to enact a ‘theory 
of mind’ about their intentions in order to pursue 
our individualistic needs. It needs to be set in the 
context of a sociocultural theory in which thinking 
is recognized as a collective as well as an individual 
activity, and which recognizes the distinctive human 
capability for combining the power of individual 
brains so that we are able to achieve more collectively 
than we can do alone. This theory also highlights 
the reciprocal developmental relationship between 
individual and collective thinking: we learn to 
reason as individuals by taking part in collective 
reasoning, but we also inluence collective reasoning 
(and its knowledge outputs) through our individual 
contributions to communal activities. The term 
‘social brain’ should thus imply the fundamental 
link between collective cognition and individual 
cognition.
This sociocultural conception of the social 
brain gives language a prime role in enabling 
collective cognition and in structuring the processes 
of individual thinking. This is not to deny that 
non-linguistic modes of representation and 
communication are important in our intellectual 
and social endeavours; but research evidence 
indicates that our evolutionary history has integrated 
language, in a special way, into both our social/
cultural activities and our higher cognitive functions. 
Research has also shown that language use is 
involved in the development of metacognition and 
reasoning, and that is why the quality of children’s 
experience of language use, in and out of school, 
can affect the course of that development. Given 
the demonstrated impact of children’s pre-school 
experience on their academic achievements, and 
the variety of that experience amongst children, the 
relationship between language and the social brain 
achieves a special signiicance in the classroom. The 
role of classroom talk for promoting the development 
of children’s skills in reasoning collectively and 
reasoning alone thus needs to be recognized as 
extremely important and be better understood. For 
some children, classroom dialogue may offer crucial 
opportunities for learning that could transform their 
social destinies.
NOTES
1. I discuss these three explanations in more detail in 
Mercer (2013).
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